Follow me on Academia.edu, Research Gate, or Twitter. Email me at zacgreene[@]gmail.com for replication materials or any other inquiries.
Greene, Zachary, Jae-Jae Spoon, and Christopher J. Williams. 2017. "Reading Between the Lines: Party Cues and SNP support for Scottish Independence and Brexit." The Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties (forthcoming).
Greene, Zachary and Amanda Licht. 2017. "Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation: the role of party preferences." Political Research Quarterly (Forthcoming).
Greene, Zachary and Christian Jensen. 2016. "Ruling Divided: Disagreement, Issue Salience and Portfolio Allocation." Party Politics, Forthcoming.
Bevan, Shaun and Zachary Greene. 2017. "Cross-National Partisan Effects on Agenda Stability." The Journal of European Public Policy, Forthcoming.
Greene, Zachary and Matthias Haber. 2017. "Maintaining Partisan Ties: Preference Divergence and Partisan Collaboration in Western Europe." Party Politics 23 (1): 30-42 .
Greene, Zachary and Matthias Haber. 201. "Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses." British Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 611-632.
Greene, Zachary. 2016. “Working through the Issues: How Issue Diversity Conditions the Impact of Ideological Disagreement on Coalition Duration.” European Political Science Review. doi:10.1017/S1755773916000114.
Greene, Zachary and Diana Z. O'Brien. 2016. "Diverse Parties, Diverse Agendas? Female Politicians and the Parliamentary Party’s Role in Platform Formation." European Journal of Political Research 55 (3): 435-453.
Bevan, Shaun and Zachary Greene. 2016. “Looking for the Party? The Effects of Partisan Change on Issue Attention in UK Acts of Parliament” European Political Science Review 8(1): 47-72.
Greene, Zachary and Christian Jensen. 2016. “Manifestos, Salience and Junior Ministerial Appointments.” Party Politics 22 (3): 382-392.
Greene, Zachary and Matthias Haber. 2015. "The Consequences of Appearing Divided: An analysis of party evaluations and vote choice." Electoral Studies 37: 15-27.
Bowen, Daniel and Zachary Greene. 2014. "Should We Measure Professionalism with and Index? A Note on Theory and Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research." State Politics and Policy Quarterly 14(3): 277-296.
Greene, Zachary, Andrea Ceron, Gijs Schumacher and Zoltan Fazekas. 2016. "The Nuts and Bolts of Automated Text Analysis. Comparing Different Document Pre-Processing Techniques in Four Countries." Open Science Framework (November 1).
"How Electoral Competition Explains Preference Convergence and Divergence in Pre-Electoral Coalitions" with Matthias Haber. LSE Europpblog April 6, 2017).
"How Intra-Party Disagreement Determines Issue Salience in Election Manifestos." Published in the Conference Proceedings of PolText 2016 The International COnference on the Advances in Computational Analysis of Political Texts.
"New Women MPs shift their party leftwards - but female leaders don't" with Diana Z. O'Brien. Democratic Audit UK (November 16, 2016).
"Setting the policy agenda: the role of economic context, parliamentary majority and party membership" with Shaun Bevan. LSE British Politics and Policy Blog (April 5, 2016).
"An enduring legacy? The independence referendum may not herald the beginning of a new era of political engagement" with Heinz Brandenburg, Neil McGarvey and Stephen Campbell. Democratic Audit Scotland (December 4, 2015).
"UK voters see divided political parties as less able to make sensible or coherent policies." Democratic Audit UK (November 21, 2014).
Parties craft their campaign messages to mobilize diverse constituencies. Theories of election strategy find that parties choose their tactics dependent on their electoral context. However, analyses on the electoral consequences of party competition have only begun to explore the dependency between context and tactic. Building on theories of party competition, I predict that the broad electoral context, such as incumbent status or the state of the economy, decides the effect of electoral tactics on the votes parties receive. Parties benefit from branching out to a wider range of issues when they are in the opposition. Instead, government parties have less control of their reputation. Economic conditions limit the incumbent’s ability to selectively construct its policy message. However, these parties profit from pairing down their policy appeals when the economy grows. Using evidence from the Comparative Manifestos Project for 24 OECD countries over a 60 year period, I find that conditioning party campaign messages on their economic environment demonstrates a clear and strong electoral impact. Individual level evidence from 12 OECD countries in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems adds evidence consistent with the underlying mechanism. Governing parties earn a reward for focusing their platforms when the economy grows more than the economy alone would predict. The results from this analysis complement a growing literature on the effect of parties’ election tactics and help explain evidence that voters only respond to parties’ election strategies.
Additional Working Papers on Academia.edu.
Dissertation: "Motivating Parliament: The Policy Consequences of Party Strategy"
Scholars rarely consider the broader policy implications of party strategies. In my dissertation, I develop a theory linking party electoral strategy to government behavior and policy. In particular, I argue that parties strategically address issues to attract previously unmotivated voters and to maintain activist support. In government, parties then construct an image of accountability on these issues with each group by using legislative procedures as policy signals. This image of accountability with voters allows the government to focus on the goals of party activists because of the activists' proximity to the party organization and leadership. I empirically test propositions on party electoral strategy using data on electoral conditions and party platforms from the CMP in 24 OECD countries 1969-2008. I focus the analysis on the French Assemblée Nationale from 1978-2007, a most difficult case, to empirically test predictions for policy signals and the government's overall policy agenda using evidence from qualitative and quantitative sources. The empirical evidence indicates government policy tends to favor activist over voter policy goals.